

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENTI 00268 01 OF 03 100358Z
ACTION EA-06

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ONY-00 ES-01 /008 W
-----100444Z 119160 /12

R 090800Z FEB 77

FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7692
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY RANGOON
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USLO PEKING
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENTIANE 0268

STADIS//////////

LIMDIS

FOR EA ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR US XB
SUBJECT: US POLICY ON SOUTHEAST ASIA IN POST-VIETNAM PERIOD

REF STATE 025347

SUMMARY: LPDR IS NOT LIKELY CONTINUE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH US INDEFINITELY UNLESS IT PERCEIVES PROSPECT OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. US LEGISLATION, MIA QUESTION, HUMAN RIGHTS, NARCOTICS TRAFFIC, LAOS/VIETNAMESE IDEOLOGICAL BIAS AGAINST NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE DESIGNS ON THAILAND, CAPACITY OF LAOS/VIET-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENTI 00268 01 OF 03 100358Z

NAM TO ABSORB ASSISTANCE AND, UNTIMATELY, COMPATIBILITY OF ASSISTANCE WITH US INTERESTS, MUST ALL AFFECT ANY NEW US POLICY CHOICE. NEW APPROACH, INCLUDING ACCEPTANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AGAINST MIA ASSURANCE, OPENING OF US BUSINESS CONTACTS WITH VIET-NAM AND SOME DEGREE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO LAOS, VIA INTERNATIONAL BODIES INITIALLY, MIGHT ESTABLISH OUR WILLINGNESS TO

"NORMALIZE" WITHOUT IMMEDIATELY MOVING TO HAGGLING ABOUT TRADITIONAL FORMS OF ASSISTANCE. THAI MIGHT WELL CONSIDER DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON SOVIET PRESENCE IN THAILAND TO MODERATE LAO/VIETNAMESE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. END SUMMARY.

1. ALMOST TWO YEARS AFTER THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVERS OF VIET-NAM AND CAMBODIA IN 1975, WE RETAIN CORRECT BUT LESS THAN CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR). THE LPDR HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT SOME FORM OF U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE "TO BIND UP THE WOUNDS OF WAR" IS AN INDISPENSABLE PRECONDITION TO ANY IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-LAO RELATIONS. THE LPDR IS CLEARLY NOT INTERESTED IN MAINTENANCE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS AS SUCH, UNACCOMPANIED BY ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

2. PARTY SECRETARY GENERAL/PRIME MINISTER KAYSONE ON THE LPDR NATIONAL DAY, DECEMBER 2, REITERATED THIS POSITION WHEN HE SPECIFICALLY STATED: "IN REGARD TO THE U.S., WHICH HAS IN THE PAST COMMITTED CRIMES AGAINST THE LAO PEOPLE, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE LPDR HAS CLEARLY EXPRESSED MANY TIMES ALREADY ITS POLICY OF MAINTAINING NORMAL RELATIONS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THESE ACCORDING TO THE ABOVE-MENTINED PRINCIPLES (RESPECT FOR INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, NON-INTERFERENCE IN OTHERS' INTERNAL AFFAIRS, EQUALITY AND MUTUAL ADVANTAGE). BUT IS IS REGRETTABLE THAT IT EVADES ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AND CONTINUES ITS HOSTILE POLICY TOWARD THE LPDR. WE REQUIRE THAT THE NEW LEADERS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENTI 00268 01 OF 03 100358Z

OF THE U.S. FULFILL THEIR COMMITMENTS IN REGARD TO BINDING UP THE WOUNDS OF WAR IN LAOS AND PUT AN END OT ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE LAO PEOPLE. IF THEY PERSIST IN THEIR FORMER POLICIES, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THEY WILL SUFFER THE UNFAVORABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR OWN ACTIONS." THE LPDR HAS INDICATED INDIRECTLY, BY REQUIRING THE DEPARTURE OF THE DEFENSE ATTACHE STAFF LAST YEAR, ON THE GROUNDS THAT NO MILITARY RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND A FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTION IN REMAINING AMERICAN PERSONNEL THIS YEAR, BECAUSE OUR RLEATIONS WERE PURELY DIPLOMATIC, THAT THE US. REPRESENTATION IN LAOS MAY SIMPLY VANISH THROUGH ATTRITION.

3. THE LPDR HAS ALSO DEMONSTRATED THAT IT ATTACHES A VERY LOW PRIORITY TO THE MISSING IN ACTION (MIA) PROBLEM. WE, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE TAKEN THE LINE SINCE MID-1975 THAT WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE RECEIPT OF INFORMATION ON AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL

LOST IN LAOS, THAT WE CANNOT DISCUSS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
BECAUSE OF U.S. LEGAL INHIBITIONS, AND THAT "THE
HEALING EFFECT OF TIME" IS NEEDED TO BRING ABOUT AN
IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-LAO RELATIONS.

4. EVEN IF WE FIND A SOLUTION TO THE MIA QUESTION AND
RESOLVE THE SPECIFIC LEGAL PROHIBITION ON ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE TO LAOS, THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER NON-
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT A SIMPLE
RESUMPTION OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WOULD NECESSARILY
BRING ABOUT ANY GREAT IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-LAO RELATIONS.
FRANCE, JAPAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AUSTRALIA, FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THAILAND ALL HAVE ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN LAOS. NONE OF THESE CONTRIBU-
TORS HAS FOUND THAT ITS AID DONOR ROLE HAS AMELIORATED
ITS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH LAOS. ALL OF THEM HAVE
BECOME AWARE OF THE LPDR INABILITY TO ABSORB ECONOMIC
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENTI 00268 01 OF 03 100358Z

ASSISTANCE EFFECTIVELY. ALTHOUGH THE LPDR WAYS IT

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENTI 00268 02 OF 03 100411Z
ACTION EA-06

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ONY-00 ES-01 /008 W
-----100446Z 119261 /12

R 090800Z FEB 77
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7693
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY RANGOON
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USLO PEKING
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 VIENTIANE 0268

STADIS//////////

LIMDIS

WANTS AID FROM ALL SOURCES, IT DIVIDES THE COUNTRIES WITH WHICH IT MAINTAINS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS INTO TWO CATEGORIES: FRATERNAL COUNTRIES (COMMUNIST) AND FRIENDLY COUNTRIES (NON-COMMUNIST). THE MAJOR ECONOMIC AID DONORS EXCEPT THE USSR AND THE PRC ARE THE LATTER CATEGORY BUT THE BETTER RELATIONS ARE MAINTAINED WITH THOSE IN THE FORMER. IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN ECONOMIC ONES.

5. EVEN IF THE MIA PROBLEM AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST AID TO LAOS COULD BE RESOLVED, AND EVEN IF THE LAO INABILITY TO ABSORB ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE COULD BE CORRECTED, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY IN DEVELOPING ANY ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE APPROACH TO LAOS TO ADDRESS THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENTI 00268 02 OF 03 100411Z

IMPORTANT QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. 76 VIENTIANE 1255 ON "HUMAN RIGHTS IN LAOS - 1976" AND OUR SUBSEQUENT REPORTING ON CONTINUED ARBITRARY ARRESTS AND CONFINEMENT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS GIVE AN IDEA OF THE DIMENSIONS OF THIS PROBLEM IN LAOS. WHILE THEY DO NOT APPROACH THOSE OF THE SAME PROBLEM IN VIETNAM OR CAMBODIA, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ARE NEVERTHELESS CONSIDERABLE AND EXPANDING. THEY INCLUDE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST DISSIDENT CIVILIANS AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS AGAINST DISSIDENTS INSIDE LAOS. WE SHOULD ALSO HAVE TO MAKE UP OUR MIND AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE LPDR POSITION IN REGARD TO THE NARCOTICS TRAFFIC WAS SATISFACTORY.

6. ANY NEW POLICY CHOICE IN REGARD TO LAOS SHOULD, WE BELIEVE, BE BASED ON A REALISTIC DETERMINATION OF WHAT WE CAN HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH WITHIN THE NARROW LIMITS OF WHAT IS NOW POSSIBLE HERE. THESE NARROW LIMITS ARE LARGELY DETERMINED BY THE PREEMINENCE OF VIETNAMESE INFLUENCE IN LAOS AND THE PREDOMINANCE OF VIETNAMESE MILITARY POWER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THIS MEANS, WE THINK, THAT THE FUTURE COURSE OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH LAOS WILL BE LARGELY DETERMINED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM. IT WILL ALSO BE DETERMINED, WE BELIEVE, TO A LESSER EXTENT BY THE WAY IN WHICH THE SOVIETS USE THEIR INFLUENCE. WE THINK THIS INFLUENCE WILL BE EXERTED TO REDUCE UNITED STATES POLITICAL PRESENCE WHILE ENCOURAGING U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE CONTRIBUTIONS, WHICH COULD SERVE TO REDUCE THE

ASSISTANCE DEMANDS MADE ON THE SOVIET UNION

7. THE PREEMINENCE OF VIETNAMESE INFLUENCE IN LAOS FLOWS FROM THE PERSONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE LEADERS, LONG STANDING PARTY TIES, A HISTORY OF WARTIME COOPERATION, GEOGRAPHY, AND IDEOLOGY. THE RELATIONSHIP IS A CLOSE AND SPECIAL ONE AND MARKED BY THE FACT THAT VIET-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENTI 00268 02 OF 03 100411Z

NAM'S POPULATION IS ABOUT 45 MILLION PEOPLE WHILE THE POPULATION OF LAOS IS NO MORE THAN 3,500,000 PEOPLE, OF WHOM ONLY ABOUT ONE HALF ARE ETHNIC LAO. THE REST ARE THE SAME SORT OF INDOCHINESE MOUNTAINEERS AS THOSE FOUND IN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM. THERE IS A CONSIDERABLE VIETNAMESE MILITARY PRESENCE IN LAOS AND IT IS ALREADY TAKING PART IN INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS. UNDER ALL THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE LAO LEADERSHIP WOULD BE ABLE TO PURSUE A POLICY INDEPENDENT OF THE WISHES OF THE SRV EVEN IF IT WANTED TO. A RECENT FRENCH OBSERVER DID NOT GREATLY EXAGGERATE WHEN HE REMARKED THAT LAOS HAS CEASED TO EXIST AS AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ENTITY.

8. THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM IS LIKELY IN TURN TO BE AFFECTED BY THE WAY IN WHICH OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES REGARD VIETNAM. TWO QUITE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES, STRONGLY ANTI-COMMUNIST THAILAND AND EXTREMELY COMMUNIST KAMPUCHEA, APPEAR TO BE, RESPECTIVELY, DOUBTFUL AND RETICENT IN THEIR CURRENT ESTIMATES OF VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS. IT IS PROBABLE THAT THESE TWO COUNTRIES AND SOME OF THE OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES PREFER TO SEE THE FUTURE ESSENTIALLY IN TERMS OF BALANCING BETWEEN CHINESE AND VIETNAMESE INFLUENCE RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF A DOMINANT VIETNAM BALANCING BETWEEN SOVIET AND CHINESE INFLUENCE. WE THINK IT POSSIBLE THAT THE CHINESE, WHO STILL HAVE A RESPECTABLE MILITARY PRESENCE IN NORTHWESTERN LAOS, MAY WELL AT SOME POINT TAKE MEASURES TO ALTER THE BALANCE OF VIETNAMESE INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THUS INDIRECTLY TO DIMINISH THAT OF THE USSR.

9. ANY NEW POLICY CHOICE IN REGARD TO VIETNAM SHOULD AGAIN, WE BELIEVE, BE BASED ON OUR BEST ESTIMATE OF WHAT EFFECT WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE WITH THE VIETNAMESE. FRANKLY, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE CAN HOPE TO ACHIEVE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENTI 00268 02 OF 03 100411Z

MUCH. ALL THAT WE HEAR FROM NON-COMMUNIST COLLEAGUES STATIONED IN HANOI INDICATES THAT OPERATIONAL INFLEXIBILITY, INCOMPETENCE, AND IDOLOGICAL RIGIDITY MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT NOT ONLY TO CONDUCT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS BUT EVEN TO CONDUCT MINIMAL BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. WILLINGNESS OF EVEN EAGERNESS OF NON-COMMUNISTS TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENTI 00268 03 OF 03 100426Z
ACTION EA-06

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ONY-00 ES-01 /008 W
-----100451Z 119394 /12

R 090800Z FEB 77
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7694
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY RANGOON
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USLO PEKING
AMEMCONSUL HONG KONG

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 VIENTIANE 0268

STADIS//////////

LIMDIS

RELATIONS OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE EFFORTS MAKE NO DIFFERENCE. IN FACT, ONCE A NON-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT SENDS A REPRESENTATIVE TO HANOI, IT SEEMS TO LOSE ALL LEVERAGE IN REGARD TO DEVELOPMENT OF SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS OR SOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS. RECIPROCITY DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATS IN FREE WORLD COUNTRIES CAN MAKE ALL THE CONTACTS THEY WANT AND SOLVE THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS ON THE OPEN MARKET. THE CURRENT FAVORITE STORY ABOUT LIFE IN THE HANOI DIPLOMATIC CROPS CONCERNS THE "VICTORY" WON BY THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR. THIS DETERMINED DIPLOMAT,

LEARNING THAT THE HANOI GOVERNMENT HAD ASSIGNED HIM A ROOM "WITHOUT A TOILET" AS HIS LIVING QUARTERS, RETURNED TO BRUSSELS AND REMAINED THERE FOR FOUR MONTHS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENTI 00268 03 OF 03 100426Z

UNTIL THE HANOI AUTHORITIES CAME AROUND AND ASSIGNED HIM A ROOM "WITH A TOILET". IN SHORT, THE RESIDENT NON-COMMUNIST DIPLOMATS ARE MERELY TOKEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THEIR COUNTRIES.

10. WE SUGGEST THAT A SOMEWHAT NEW APPROACH TO THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH HANOI MIGHT MOVE US OUT OF THE POSITION OF APPARENT RELUCTANCE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITHOUT MOVING US IMMEDIATELY INTO HAGGLING ABOUT ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO "BIND UP THE WOUNDS OF WAR", ASSISTANCE WHICH MIGHT NOT BE THE KIND THE VIETNAMESE COULD ABSORB ANYWAY AND WHICH MIGHT NOT BE THE KIND THAT WOULD BE IN OUR OWN INTERESTS OR THE INTERESTS OF OUR FRIENDS TO SUPPLY. WE WOULD CERTAINLY NEVER BE ABLE TO APPLY THE TRADITIONAL END USE CHECKS AND OTHER MONITORING PROCEDURES IN THE SRV ENVIRONMENT. WE WOULD THINK A NEW APPROACH MIGHT FOLLOW ROUGHLY ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES. WE WOULD ACCEPT SOME REASONABLE ASSURANCES THAT THE MIA PROBLEM HAD BEEN SOLVED ONCE AND FOR ALL BY THE PROVISION OF ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND THAT IT WOULD NOT AGAIN BE USED IN A BARGAINING CONTEXT. WE WOULD AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION AND TO AN EXCHANGE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE LATTER TO BE DEFERRED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS IT WAS ADMINISTRATIVELY FEASIBLE AND CONVENIENT TO BOTH PARTIES. WE WOULD AUTHORIZE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES TO MAKE WHATEVER SHIPMENTS OF NON-STRATEGIC MATERIALS THEY DESIRED TO VIETNAM WITHOUT EXPORT LICENSES. WE WOULD ENCOURAGE AMERICAN POTENTIAL INVESTORS, IMPORTERS, EXPORTERS, DEVELOPERS AND PROMOTERS TO CONTACT THE VIETNAMESE FREELY AND TO USE THEIR OWN EXPERTISE AND BUSINESS SENSE IN SIZING UP THE POSSIBILITIES OF THE "MARKET" AND BECOMING FAMILIAR WITH THE VIETNAMESE MANNER OF DEALING WITH FOREIGN BUSINESSMEN. SUCH CONTACTS OR THE ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP THEM MIGHT SERVE TO CLARIFY VIETNAMESE AIMS AND INTENTIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENTI 00268 03 OF 03 100426Z

11. ANY SUCH APPROACH TO VIETNAMESE SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN EXPLORATION WITH THE LAO OF THE POSSIBILI-

TIES OF PROVIDING CERTAIN TYPES OF HUMANITARIAN AID NOT IN THE CONTEXT OF "BINDING UP THE WOUNDS OF WAR" OR MEETING LAO POLITICAL DEMANDS, BUT IN THE CONTEXT OF TRADITIONAL U.S. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN REGARD TO FOOD, MEDICINES, MEDICAL EXPERTISE AND, PERHAPS, EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DEMOLITION. GIVEN THE LIMITS OF THE POSSIBILITIES OPEN TO US IN LAOS, THIS EXPLORATION SHOULD BE CONFINED TO CONSIDERATION OF DISTRIBUTION OF COMMODITIES IN SMALL BUT RESPECTABLE AMOUNTS ALONG THE LINES FOLLOWED BY THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS BUT SELECTED CAREFULLY TO SUPPLEMENT EXISTING UNITED NATIONS SPECIALIZED AGENCY PROGRAMS. INITIALLY, AT LEAST, SUCH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WOULD BE FUNNELED THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

WE COULD REMIND THE LAO FIRST THAT OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THESE ORGANIZATIONS, ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY AVAILABLE FOR LAOS, ENABLED THEM TO MAKE MORE FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR LAOS. LATER WHEN LEGALLY POSSIBLE WE COULD LET THE LAO KNOW THAT WE WERE ALLOWING UNHCR, ADB, IBRD AND OTHER SUCH ENTITIES TO USE OUR CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE LPDR.

12. FINALLY, WE NOTE THAT ALL EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO US SUGGESTS THAT THE LAO, AND, THROUGH THEM, THE VIETNAMESE, ARE GOING TO MAINTAIN A FAIR LEVEL OF ACTIVITY AGAINST THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THAILAND. THEY ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO PROJECT PROPAGANDA, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND SOME DEGREE OF MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY ACROSS THE MEKONG, A RIVER WHICH A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN VIENTIANE HAS DESCRIBED AS "A FRONTIER BETWEEN TWO WORLDS". WE WOULD SUPPOSE THAT THE THAI, SHREWDAS THEY ARE, ARE AWARE THAT THEY POSSESS A DIPLOMATIC MEANS OF MODERATING THE VIETNAMESE-LAO

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENTI 00268 03 OF 03 100426Z

THREAT TO SOME EXTENT, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT RUN. THEY MIGHT DECIDE THAT IN EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES THE LARGE DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THAILAND OF THE SOVIET UNION, PRINCIPAL PATRON OF THE VIETNAMESE/LAO, SERVES NO GREAT PURPOSE AND OUGHT TO BE REDUCED. THE THAI MIGHT DECIDE TO COMMENCE SUCH A REDUCTION IN "SLICES", SPACED AT SUITABLE INTERVALS.

CORCORAN

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 09-Feb-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977VIENTI00268
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770047-0388
Format: TEL
From: VIENTIANE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770256/aaaabxsr.tel
Line Count: 433
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 8ebf18c9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Reference: 77 STATE 25347
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07-Jan-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3359204
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: US POLICY ON SOUTHEAST ASIA IN POST-VIETNAM PERIOD
TAGS: PFOR, US, XB
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbs://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/8ebf18c9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009